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THE AMBIGUITY OF INDISCERNIBILITY
John Dilworth
I argue that there is an ambiguity in the concept of indiscernibility as applied to objects, because there are two different categories of properties, associated with two different ways in which all of the pre-theoretical 'properties' of an object may be identified.  In one structural way, identifications of properties are independent of any particular spatial orientation of the object in question, but in another 'field' way, identifications are instead dependent on an object's particular spatial orientation, so that its properties as thus identified in one orientation are distinct from its properties as identified in any other orientation--all of which ‘field’ properties must hence also be distinct from the previous structurally defined properties. 

To accommodate the two kinds of intrinsic properties, the standard concept of indiscernibility is redefined as structural indiscernibility, while a new concept of field indiscernibility is introduced.  I argue among other things that, though two objects may be structurally indiscernible under all orientational (and other) conditions, those objects may nevertheless fail to have field indiscernibility with each other under some orientational conditions.  I also briefly discuss the implications of these results for general issues about the nature of properties, and of realist versus nominalist approaches to them.

In the physical sciences it is now generally accepted that some basic physical properties of objects may be in some way relative to observer frameworks of reference.  For example, the Einsteinian Theory of Relativity postulates as much for temporal properties such as simultaneity.  It is also generally accepted that quantum mechanics shows that at least some epistemic activities of scientific observation cannot be clearly or cleanly separated from the ontological results discoverable by such observation.

Such results amount to a claim of (what could be called) description-relativity for some basic physical or ontological properties, in a broad sense of description-relativity that includes both mathematical frameworks of reference, and observational descriptions produced during actual experimental investigations of appropriate properties.

However, the possible implications of such relatively exotic scientific results for more traditional metaphysical issues remain under-explored. In this paper I shall argue that the fundamental metaphysical concept of an intrinsic property is thus description-relative--at least, as applied to concrete physical objects--by showing that there are two fundamentally different kinds of frameworks of reference (to be called 'structural' versus 'field' frameworks) with respect to concrete intrinsic properties, which result in ontologically distinct properties in each case.  Thus as a result there are two fundamentally different, but equally legitimate, ways of describing the pre-theoretical concept of all of the intrinsic properties of an object.

But an implication of this result is that the basic metaphysical concept of indiscernibility for objects--holding for objects that have all of their intrinsic properties in common--is ambiguous between the two different kinds of description-relative accounts of the intrinsic properties of objects.

Now it might be thought that such a result, even if correct, would itself be relatively exotic and theoretical, with no practical applications to, for example, everyday epistemic situations involving normal perceptions of middle-sized objects.  However, it will turn out that evidence for the ambiguity in question is pervasive and perceptually unavoidable.

Thus I shall argue that there is a significant ambiguity in the concept of indiscernibility, insofar as it applies to objects--that is, to particulars or tokens rather than to kinds or types--and I shall also raise some related issues concerning the identity of properties, and of realist versus nominalist approaches to them.  

But first, some conceptual preliminaries.  Particular objects, such as physical objects, are usually construed as being metaphysically indiscernible (hereafter simply: indiscernible) just in case their intrinsic properties are identical, i.e., they have all of their intrinsic properties in common.​[1]​  (Hereafter all unqualified references to 'properties' will be to intrinsic properties).

The concept of indiscernibility by its very nature cannot be relativized to a certain respect, such as 'being indiscernible in physical, mental etc. properties', because such cases are merely cases where objects share properties of a certain kind, while being different in other respects; clearly no such cases are genuinely indiscernible, i.e., such that objects have all of their intrinsic properties in common.  

One can raise similar doubts about a putative epistemic concept of indiscernibility, such as that of objects being 'perceptually indiscernible', in that normal perceivers cannot tell them apart.  For since no amount of natural--rather than godlike--epistemic access to objects could guarantee that one had been in cognitive contact with all of the properties of an object, there is, strictly speaking, no genuine epistemic concept of indiscernibility to correspond to the metaphysical concept of indiscernibility.

However, it is important to distinguish that point from a related one, namely that one could acquire justified evidence as to the metaphysical indiscernibility of objects through perceptual or other epistemic means.  A claim by a perceiver that 'Objects A and B look perceptually indistinguishable to me' is not a claim of 'epistemic indiscernibility', but it could be used as evidence that some of the perceptually accessible properties of A and B are identical, possibly as part of a more general claim that all of the properties of A and B are identical.  Equally, a justified claim of perceptual distinguishability could provide strong evidence of a failure of metaphysical indiscernibility.  In this paper any mention of perceptual or other epistemic considerations will be of this evidential kind, since the focus is purely on metaphysical indiscernibility, and I shall talk of epistemic distinguishability or indistinguishability in certain respects, rather than discernibility or indiscernibility, for clarity's sake.  Also, any discussion of 'properties' will be about intrinsic properties in the absence of a contrary indication.


2.  An Indiscernibility Conflict 









As an initial, epistemic question, are the two objects A and B, as shown by these diagrams 1 and 2,  perceptually indistinguishable?   Surely not, for the two diagrams could be used as one of the easier pairs in a test of people's ability to perceptually discriminate related but distinguishable objects.  Indeed, it would be a sign of some kind of cognitive dysfunction if a person were unable to perceptually discriminate object A's right-pointing arrow, as shown in diagram 1, from object B's left-pointing arrow as shown in diagram 2.

Also, it is important that this perceptual distinguishability is not merely an observer-relative phenomenon--one depending on the observer's orientation with respect to the objects--because their perceptual distinguishability would persist no matter what observer-relative orientation the diagrams are viewed in (on which see Section 3).

However, since perceptual distinguishability in such a straightforward case presumably provides generally reliable evidence of intrinsic property non-identity for some specific range of properties of the object shown in each diagram, we now have apparently conflicting evidence as to the indiscernibility of objects A and B.  For in spite of the stipulated indiscernibility of the two objects in the conventional sense, it seems that when the two objects are placed in a different spatial orientation--and no matter how the objects in their resultant orientations are viewed--the objects provide reliable perceptual evidence that some of the properties of each object are not identical with each other.

How can this apparent conflict be explained?   I propose to do so by distinguishing two categorially different kinds of properties, associated with two different ways in which all of the pre-theoretical  'intrinsic properties' of an object may be identified.  In one structural or inherent way, identifications of properties are independent of any particular orientation of the object in question, so that the postulated indiscernibility of objects A and B is preserved; but in another 'field' way, to be defined shortly, identifications are instead dependent on the object's particular orientation, so that properties thus identified in one orientation are distinct from its properties as identified in any other distinct orientation--all of which ‘field’ properties must hence also be distinct from the previous structurally defined properties. 

Thus my claim will be that the pre-theoretical concept of 'all of the properties' of an object, as used in the standard definition of indiscernibility, is in need of revision, because in actuality there are two categorically distinct ranges of intrinsic properties, each of which may legitimately claim to give a complete ontological account of the pre-theoretical totality of ‘the properties’ of an object.  It is for this reason that I describe my thesis as that of the ambiguity of (the concept of) indiscernibility, rather than merely claiming that there are different kinds of standard indiscernibility.

Thus it will be necessary to introduce a new and distinct indiscernibility concept: the standard concept will be redescribed as structural indiscernibility (SI), while the new concept will be described as field indiscernibility (FI).  It will turn out that structurally indiscernible objects may or may not also be field indiscernible.


3.  Field Orientation

Before proceeding further, since spatial orientation has become an issue we should explicitly specify the relevant concept of field orientation,​[3]​ which concerns the orientation of an object with respect to its environmental field, which both surrounds and permeates it.  (And in general in this paper, if the term 'orientation' is used without qualification it is field orientation that is meant).  Thus for example, if an object is inverted then it changes its field orientation (that is, its orientation with respect to its environmental field) by 180 degrees. 

An environmental field also can be considered as providing an unchanging metric grid--a two or three-dimensional array of field positions​[4]​--relative to which the field position of various parts of an object, and the pre-theoretical ‘properties’ of those parts, may be determined.  Typically a change in field orientation for an object will result in any given one of its parts moving to a new and distinct field position in the unchanging field grid,​[5]​ which will also typically result, I shall argue, in a change in its 'field' properties themselves (on which see the next Section).  


4.  Structural Versus Field Properties

I shall describe as structural properties those specific properties of an object that are independent of its field orientation, whereas those of its properties that are instead dependent on its field orientation are its field properties.  

Thus all of the standard intrinsic properties of an object are structural properties, since the category of field properties--viewed strictly as a metaphysical or ontological rather than as a perceptual, epistemic category--seems to be a previously neglected one. 

An example of the structural properties of an object is provided by various internal geometric properties of an object, such as the metric and angular relations of three points A, B and C in a triangular formation on the surface of an object. Clearly these relations will remain invariant through field orientation changes for the object. 

As for field properties, an initial account of the perceivable differences between the two orientations of object A, as shown by diagrams 1 and 2, would suggest that they give evidence of properties that differ in position and orientation from each other.  Since the physical parts of object A have different field positions in each case, they have different orientational or field properties. 

Now I shall show that field orientation and field properties are, in the intended sense, intrinsic properties.   As a preliminary, clearly there is a possible observer-relative concept of orientation for objects, which concerns the external relations of an object's intrinsic field grid to an observer's field grid, and which gives rise to extrinsic or relational orientational properties of the object, relative to the observer.  However, those extrinsic properties are of no interest here.  The relevant concepts of field orientation and field properties of an object concern those of its non-relational, non-structural properties that remain invariant--and which hence are intrinsic--no matter what observer-relative, extrinsic orientational properties the object may acquire as a result of the actions of observers.  

In this connection, recall the point in Section 1 that perceptual distinguishability of two orientations of distinct objects A and B, as with diagrams 1 and 2, is not merely an observer-relative phenomenon, because their perceptual distinguishability persists, no matter what observer-relative orientation the diagrams are viewed in.  Thus the relevant orientational concepts concern whatever must be the invariant ontological properties of the two objects in those differing orientations, which must be invoked in order to explain such persistent perceptual differences.  Thus field properties, as with any intrinsic properties, would exist even in a world with no observers.





5. The Nature of Field Properties

But what exactly are field properties, and how do they relate to structural properties?  I shall discuss three likely candidate theories (one here, and two in the next Section) as to their nature, using as an example the properties associated with some given one of the dark gray line segments--such as its grayness--that make up the pointed part of the arrow configuration of object A, as shown in diagram 1.  

The first theory is an attempted reductive or minimalist one.  It would claim that, though individual physical parts of object A have positional properties, such as that of ‘being located at field co-ordinates M,N’​[6]​—‘field-located’ for short--nevertheless the grayness itself is not thus field-located, other than in the roundabout sense in which it is a property of a physical part that is itself field-located.  

However, this first theory suffers from at least two critical defects.  First, our ability to identify the grayness of a given part as being a property of that part--rather than of some other, differently-located part--inevitably presupposes that the grayness itself must have a location, namely the same location as that of the physical part whose property it is.  But what is more, there typically is no independent way to identify a given part or region of an object, other than by identifying the location of the relevant properties, that hence serve to define the location and boundaries of the physical part. 
 
The second defect of the first theory is that it commits a fallacy of relevance, because it simply changes the subject: instead of discussing field properties of object A itself, as required, it instead discusses properties of individual parts of object A.  And if that procedure itself were defended as a legitimate analytical procedure—that for any object X, one must analyze any properties of object X as properties of parts of X—it would then be subject to a crippling regress, since presumably one must continue to re-apply the procedure to each part as identified in a previous stage of the regress, since each such part is itself an object X that is subject to the procedure. 

However, this is not to deny a plausible view about the relations of whole objects and their parts, namely that the very same properties possessed by the whole object may also be possessed by those of its parts whose boundaries include the relevant field locations of the properties in question.  For that point requires simultaneous satisfaction, by a putative property, of logical demands both by the whole object and by the relevant parts, whereas the first theory tries to reduce those demands to those minimally necessary to account for the properties of a single part--namely the minimal region whose field boundaries exactly match those necessary to account for (what is pre-theoretically) the field position of the relevant property itself.

Having dismissed the first theory, it seems unavoidable from the considerations raised that--insofar as it is the properties of A itself, rather than of its parts, that must primarily be considered--one could not identify the relevant properties specifically enough to distinguish them from properties associated with other regions of the object without accepting that each property itself must in some manner be field-located.​[7]​  

For pre-theoretically there are several different gray line segments, each having its own distinct field location, so that insofar as the grayness of any one of them is to be a property of A itself, it must be distinguished from the grayness of the others by its in some way having, or its being indexed to, its own particular field location. And in any case, even for a single occurrence of a property, such as might occur in another object including only a single line segment, it would be insufficiently specific to simply attribute the property to the object--for that would not distinguish cases where an object is gray all over from those in which a single specific region of the object, having specific locational coordinates, is associated with the property.

Thus it has been established (without even considering any more specific theories as to the nature of field properties) that field properties must be themselves field-located,​[8]​ so that, as field properties, they are distinct from any differently-located field properties, including from those that have an otherwise identical ‘qualitative content’.

This is an important result, because it enables us to establish two further significant results as well, as follows.  First, we now have a metaphysical explanation as to why the two orientations of object A, as shown by diagrams 1 and 2, are perceptually distinguishable: it is because their actual field properties are distinct, in that each of them is partly individuated by its differing specific field location in each of the two different orientations of object A. 

The second result is that structural and field properties must be non-identical, because no structural property is partly individuated by field location, whereas all field properties are thus individuated.​[9]​  This result is significant as supporting the initial intuitive picture of two distinct ranges of properties--structural and field—that each by itself could give a complete account of all of the pre-theoretical intrinsic properties of an object.

Some further considerations can bolster the 'completeness' aspect of that intuitive picture.  
A desirable conclusion having that effect would be that all of the field properties in a given field orientation of an object may be correlated one to one with all of the structural properties of the object, hence giving specificity to the claim that each property-range can be complete—because each is equally or equivalently complete as a result of the correlation.   

The argument for that conclusion is follows.  It hinges on the fact that instances of a given property can be recognized as being in some sense 'the same' as each other, whether or not they are being perceived as structural or as field properties--in some intuitive sense each has the same 'qualitative content', which content can conceptually be separated from the purely formal, positional differences that individuate specific instances of field properties. 

Thus in some intuitive sense it is obvious that the structural, orientation-independent grayness of a line segment is 'the same' as, or at least closely associated or correlated with, a field 'grayness' property that is also associated with that same physical line segment, when its field properties are being considered.  Indeed, any required argumentative heavy lifting is predominantly in the other direction, that is, in attempting to show that those seemingly identical structural and field properties must nevertheless be logically distinct, in spite of their closely associated contents.  Thus I conclude that the desired correlation conclusion--that all of the field properties in a given field orientation of an object may be correlated one to one with all of the structural properties of the object--has been established.


6.  Field and Structural Properties

To begin this Section, here is the promised consideration of two further theories as to the nature of field properties, now that the first theory has been rejected and some initial results have been achieved, one of which is the fact that each field property must in some way include a field location.  

The second theory would regard field properties as compound properties, in some way consisting of the correlated structural property plus the required field location.  This theory might initially be regarded as the simplest remaining hypothesis, given that structural and field properties must be correlated one to one, and that each field property must also have a field location.  The theory also has the advantage that it can explain the intuitive sameness of qualitative content of structural and field properties, since on this second theory each field property in some way includes the relevant structural property.
 
Nevertheless, in spite of these attractive features, there is an irreducible doubt concerning this second theory, for the following reasons.  Field properties were introduced as a necessary theoretical response to the fact that there must be some differences in properties associated with different orientations of two otherwise indiscernible objects A and B, as shown by diagrams 1 and 2, in order to account for the perceptual distinguishability of objects A and B.

However, once that need was recognized, the actual arguments for field properties including a field location did not depend on any further comparisons of different field orientations of object A; instead the arguments were purely about the need to make precise, within a given, single field orientation of the object, what it is that ontologically makes it true that the object has the property of being gray in some specific locations that are distinguished from each other, and also distinguished from other possible locations--including the possible maximal location that would be involved if the object were uniformly gray all over. 

But the specific focus of the irreducible doubt in question is on the status of structural rather than field properties.  For if a single field orientation of an object requires location indexed properties to account for their individuation, why should the case be any different with the object's structural properties?  For after all, both structural and field properties are properties of one and the same spatially extended physical object, and they are intimately related, being in one to one correlation to each other--so if the field properties of a single orientation necessarily must be spatially indexed, must not structural properties also require some kind of spatial location indexing?​[10]​

The case for parity of structural and field properties with respect to their own kinds of location indexing may be strengthened by the following thought experiment.  Imagine the object in some particular orientation relative to a field grid, which grid is fixed in space.  Now suppose that an exact copy of that grid, in its current position relative to the object, is fixed relative to that object itself rather than being fixed in space--so that when the object rotates, its structural grid (to give it a name) rotates with it.  Thus all of the structural properties remain fixed relative to the object's structural grid during changes in orientation, and hence both the structural properties and the structural grid are independent of the object's orientation.

However, in the initial orientation of both field and structural grids--when they spatially coincided--precisely the same arguments that necessitated field indexing of field properties would also necessitate structural indexing--via the structural grid--of structural properties.  For the only basic metaphysical difference between the kinds of properties is that field properties have an additional kind of contingency, namely sensitivity to orientational changes, that structural properties lack; but there is no reason to think that either group of properties differ in any of their other individuation criteria, including the need for an appropriate kind of spatial indexing for each.  Thus I conclude that structural properties require their own structure specific form of location indexing--using a structural grid--just as much as do field properties by use of their own field grid.

To summarize the course of the argument, the second theory attempted to regard field properties as compound properties, which in some way consisted of the correlated structural property plus the required field location.  But that view has now been undermined, because there is no longer a single structural property (such as 'structural grayness') that could serve as the common or invariant qualitative element in the relevant field-indexed grayness properties.  Instead, what corresponds to a field indexed field property F' is now a structurally indexed structural property F--and no fundamental  metaphysical reason has been found as to why either should be regarded as being more basic than the other. Thus, at least tentatively, a resulting third theory as to the relations of field and structural properties, that regards each as being sui generis and metaphysically equally basic, would seem to be the most plausible one--and the one here adopted.


7. Structural Versus Field Indiscernibility

We can now proceed with the definitions announced at the end of Section 2, that is, of a new indiscernibility concept of field indiscernibility (F-indiscernibility or FI), with the standard concept of indiscernibility being redefined as structural indiscernibility (S-indiscernibility or SI.  For we now have, for any given orientational states of numerically distinct objects, two distinct ways of describing all of the properties of each object, with a one to one correlation between the relevant structural and field properties of a given object in a given orientation, and with descriptions invoking the correlated properties being, as one would expect, logically equivalent.  As one would expect, each of our definitions of indiscernibility will use the appropriate range of properties--structural properties for S-indiscernibility (SI) and field properties for F-indiscernibility (FI).

Thus metaphysically or objectively speaking, two objects are structurally indiscernible just in case they have all their structural properties in common, while two objects are field indiscernible just in case they have all their field properties in common.  

However, two additional definitions are needed for field indiscernibility, so as to cover all of the possible cases.  These second and third versions of the F-indiscernibility principle are (existential and universal) quantificational variants of it.  A concept of weak F-indiscernibility may be defined as follows: objects A and B are weakly F-indiscernible just in case there is some field orientation OA for A, and some field orientation OB for B, such that in those particular orientations OA and OB, A and B are F-indiscernible.  Thus weak FI and SI for objects are mutually entailing, since if two objects are structurally indiscernible, then there must be some field orientation for each in which they are F-indiscernible, and vice versa.

And finally, a concept of strong F-indiscernibility may be defined as follows: objects A and B are strongly F-indiscernible just in case, for any field orientation of A, and any field orientation of B, A and B are F-indiscernible.  A possible example of strongly FI objects is two featureless, equal-sized spheres made of the same material, which presumably would each have the same properties no matter what field orientation they were placed in.






To conclude, I shall briefly consider some potential broader philosophical implications of the evidence presented, and the metaphysical results arrived at here, though limitations of space preclude anything more than a brief summary of these.  They generally point to the current theory as occupying a middle position between realism and nominalism.

As far as the ontology of properties goes, the results could provide some significant additional ammunition for those nominalists who deny that any real properties exist,​[11]​ for the following reasons.  The methods used here show that pre-theoretical 'real properties', such as the grayness of certain parts of the surface of an object, cannot after all be a single real property, on no less than two independent grounds.  First there is the point that both structural and field properties must be spatially indexed, which could be regarded as one way of expressing a minimal nominalist point that everything that concretely exists must be particular, whether or not both objects and properties exist.​[12]​  

But in addition, the demonstrated need to recognize both structural and field properties in connection with a single pre-theoretical 'property' might provide an additional nominalist reason to reject properties, on the ground that they are somehow too descriptively complex to be real--perhaps, for instance, some nominalists might argue that in some way they must be mere artifacts of our different spatial ways of identifying actual objects, that could not have a genuinely objective status, in spite of the fact that the relevant ways of identifying them as intrinsic properties are as basic and defensible as any other parts of observational science.

Another possible implication of the data and results is more along realist lines, namely that they point to a situation somewhat analogous to that in quantum mechanics, in which light (for instance) seems to behave both like quantized particles and like homogeneous waves.  In terms of this analogy, the evidence implies a claim that any observations of pre-theoretical 'real properties' break down into two basic kinds of more specialized properties that are distinct from, and irreducible to, each other. (Indeed, this seems the most defensible initial interpretation of the data--hence its general use in this paper in describing the results).  However, the non-identity of differently indexed properties, whether field or structural, in the present account seems to preclude it from being regarded as a traditional theory of universals, which would require identity of property instances in all cases.

Finally, there are also some anti-nominalist considerations that would distinguish the current theory from nominalism as well as realism.  Consider the traditional nominalist view that only entities occupying the same spatial position can have identical properties.  The current theory would seem to be inconsistent with such a view, in that it allows that there could be numerically and spatially distinct objects that were nevertheless S-indiscernible or F-indiscernible.
 
















^1	  The intrinsic properties of an object are, roughly speaking, those that remain invariant in spite of, or independent of, its relations with, or causal influences by, other distinct objects.  However, the exact definition of the term has been disputed recently, as a result of a paper by R. Langton and D. Lewis, "Defining 'Intrinsic'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, no.2 (1998), pp. 333-345.  
^2	   Thus I shall ignore as irrelevant any possible symbolic or representational content that might also be conventionally associated with those relevant physical properties.
^3	   I defined a related but extrinsic concept of field orientation in "Varieties of Visual Representation", Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 183-205. 
^4	   In a fuller treatment of three dimensional objects, naturally a three dimensional rather than two dimensional field grid would be necessary, but for the purposes of this paper a two dimensional field grid will be all that is needed to make the needed distinctions.As for the status of the grid itself, it, and its units of measurement, are only an epistemic device to aid us in keeping track of the spatial location of field properties of objects--so that the grid itself does not have any ontological status.
^5	   Only typically, because, e.g., a circular, uniformly featured part whose center is the axis of rotation for changes in orientation would retain the same set of field positions during any rotational changes.  (But even in that case, the physical parts of that part would have changed their field positions in any rotations that are not an exact multiple of 360 degrees).
^6	   A more precise characterization would require specification of the exact co-ordinates of each point on the boundary of the area that defines the physical extent of the object-part in question.
^7	   For if there could not be any epistemic evidence as to the distinctness of the relevant properties unless they are postulated to be themselves field-located, then it could not be an epistemically defensible metaphysical hypothesis that there are distinct but non-locationally-distinguished properties.  For though concrete particulars might be merely numerically distinct, it is not clear that it even makes sense to suggest that there could be distinct properties that are not distinguished from each other in some manner.
^8	   Including the many properties, such as the composition and shape of an object, whose field-location characteristics will presumably be the same as those for the object itself in its current orientation.
^9	   However, this does not rule out that structural properties might be in some way be ingredients in compound field properties: see the second theory in the next Section.
^10	   It is easy to miss this point, because, as noted above, the initial need for field indexing arose from the possibility of multiple distinct orientations for an object, whereas there is no such multiplicity of possibilities for structural properties.  
^11	   Such as Quine and his followers.
^12	   For example, as found in various forms of 'trope' nominalism, recently reintroduced by Keith Campbell in his book Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
^13	   My thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
